More about Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties by Inbau, Fred E.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 89
Issue 4 Summer Article 14
Summer 1999
More about Public Safety v. Individual Civil
Liberties
Fred E. Inbau
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Fred E. Inbau, More about Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1421 (1998-1999)
0091-4169/99/8904-1421
TM JOuRMAL OF CRum;AL LAW & CRDAINOLOGY Vol. 89, No. 4
Copyright 0 1962 by Northwestern Univeity, School of Law Printed In U.S.A.
MORE ABOUT PUBLIC SAFETY V.
INDIVIDUAL CIVIL LIBERTIES"
FRED E. INBAU
Whenever a champion of individual civil liberties is branded
as anti-American or as a fellow traveler of the communists he
becomes highly incensed. And rightly so, because there is noth-
ing un-American about being a civil libertarian, even of the
starry-eyed variety; and a person can be an avid civil libertarian
without embracing Communism. But many civil libertarians are
themselves subject to the same fallacious reasoning with which
their critics are sometimes afflicted. They assume that when a
person criticizes court decisions which he considers too restric-
tive of police functions, that critic must be in favor of a "police
state"; he must be of a Fascist bent of mind; he must be inter-
ested in allowing the police to do anything they please; he must
favor the use of the "third degree," illegal searches and seizures,
and all other police practices that the courts have condemned.'
It is high time that we shed ourselves of the kind of intoler-
ance and misconceptions that prevail on both sides.
The police will have to accept the fact that in any demo-
cratic society police efficiency must necessarily incur a consider-
able measure of sacrifice in deference to the rights and liberties
of the individual. They must realize that the public at large has
made that decision and the police have no right to change it.
On the other hand, the civil libertarian must appreciate the fact
that some sacrifice of individual rights and liberties has to be
made in order to achieve and maintain a safe, stable society in
which the individual may exercise those rights and liberties.
They cannot be exercised in a vacuum. In the recent words of a
* Originally printed in 53J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY& P.S. 329 (1962).
'See particularly the criticism aimed at my views in the letters published in the "Notes and
Announcements" section of theJune, 1962, number of this Journal (53J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 231
(1962)).
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federal district court judge, "Pure liberty with no restraints pro-
duces anarchy, while pure discipline brings in the police state."2
In Professor Yale Kamisar's 23 page article in the last issue
of this Journa replying to the four page reproduction of a
speech I had delivered at a meeting of the National District At-
torneys' Association, he quotes with approval Reinhold Nie-
buhr's statement that "democracy is a method of finding
proximate solutions for insoluble problems."3 Let me apply that
fine statement to the differing viewpoints which Professor Ka-
misar and I have expressed with reference to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio--the 1961 case which
imposed the exclusionary rule upon all the states as a require-
4
ment of due process.
For many years the people of the State of Michigan sought
to find a "proximate solution" to the "insoluble problem" of il-
legal search and seizure, and they were struggling with the prob-
lem during the time when the Supreme Court was holding that
the exclusionary rule was only a rule of evidence which the
states were at liberty to accept or reject.
By constitutional amendments in 1936 and 1952, the people
of the State of Michigan-not just their representatives in the
legislature-worked out what they thought to be a "proximate
solution" to this "insoluble problem." They decided that the
exclusionary rule was a good rule except as regards its applica-
tion to narcotics and dangerous instrumentalities such as fire-
arms and explosives. As to these various articles, the
prosecution could use them as evidence regardless of the illegal-
ity of their seizure, provided the seizure did not involve an inva-
sion of a person's home.5 Here, then, was a democratic effort to
arrive at a "proximate solution" to a very difficult problem-a
problem that all the states had wrestled with from time to time,
and, as we know, they were about evenly divided at the time of
the 1961 Mapp decision; half of the states accepted and half re-
jected the exclusionary rule.
What right, I again ask, did the Supreme Court have to tell
the people of Michigan in its 6 to 3 decision in Mapp v. Ohio,
'Comment ofJudge Wade H. McCree,Jr., quoted in the Detroit News of Feb. 25, 1962.
1Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53J. GRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 171, 184 (1962).
' 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'MICH. CONST. 1908, art. II, § 10 (as amended in 1936 and 1952).
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that they were in gross error as regards the "proximate solution"
they were seeking in their 1936 and 1952 amendments to the
Michigan constitution? Let us remember that here was a state
that had not ignored the problem. To the contrary, it was ear-
nestly seeking a solution, and once again I call attention to the
fact that at the time when the people of Michigan were making
that effort they were privileged, to do so insofar as the United
States Supreme Court was concerned, because all along the
Court had considered the exclusionary rule to be only a rule of
evidence; it did not evolve into a due process requirement until
the 6 to 3 decision in Mapp v. Ohio onJune 19, 1961.
I do not think that the Court was justified in holding that its
judgment (or rather that of six of the nine Justices) was superior
to that exercized [sic] by the people of Michigan and the many
other states that did not consider the exclusionary rule to be the
solution to the problem of illegal searches and seizures. And if I
am to be looked upon as a legal heretic for thinking so, then I
have the company of some respectable fellow heretics-the
three Justices who dissented in the Mapp case.6 Also among my
fellow heretics may be added the majority of the members of
Michigan's 1962 Constitutional Convention. They decided to
include in the proposed revised constitution a provision which
perpetuates the Michigan viewpoint as expressed by the people
of that state in their 1936 and 1952 amendments to their pres-
ent constitution. Moreover, the Convention did this while fully
aware of Mapp v. Ohio and all its implications. They were suffi-
ciently convinced of the merits of their own "proximate solu-
tion" to again declare-in rather specific defiance to the Mapp
decision-that the provisions of the constitution regarding
searches and seizures "shall not be construed to bar from evi-
dence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm,
bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a
peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this
state."7
What the Supreme Court did in Mapp it is also likely to do
someday with respect to confessions obtained by state law en-
forcement officers who have interrogated arrestees while delay-
' In this connection, I should also like to point out that when I say that the Supreme Court
has no right to police the police, I have some company in the person of Mr.Justice Harlan. See
his dissent in Reav. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956).
MICH. CONST., art. I, § 11, as finally adopted by the Convention on May 11, 1962. See No.
136A, State of MichiganJournal of the Constitutional Convention.
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ing in taking them before a committing magistrate or while they
were without counsel during their police detention. The Court
may tell the states that they must adopt the same rules and stan-
dards that the Court has prescribed for federal courts and fed-
eral law enforcement officers. And that possibility disturbs me
more than what the Court did in Mapp v. Ohio. I think the ef-
fect would be disastrous to law enforcement and to the public's
welfare and safety. State law enforcement officers can live with
the exclusionary rule a lot easier than they could with a McNabb-
Mallory rule that would, in effect, prohibit local law enforcement
officers from interrogating criminal suspects.8 By modernizing
the laws of arrest and search and seizure, either by legislative
enactments or court decisions (as the California and Illinois
courts have done), there will be far fewer occasions for the po-
lice to violate the law as a matter of practical necessity; and
there will be less need for the courts to reject incriminating evi-
dence. But to deprive the police of an opportunity to conduct
criminal interrogations-by a Supreme Court decision founded
upon constitutional considerations-would produce conse-
quences that cannot be modified in the same way as is possible
with respect to arrests, searches and seizures.
Contrary to what Professor Kamisar implies,9 I am not one
of those who attributes the rise in the national crime rate, or
even a substantial part of it, to the "turn 'em loose" court deci-
sions of the past several years. There are other factors of con-
siderably greater significance. However, I am convinced that
some of the increase in crime is due to such decisions, and this
factor will enlarge in significance if the present "turn 'em loose"
trend continues.
Critics of the view I expressed regarding the decision in
Mallory v. United State?° charge that there is no statistical proof
that the McNabb-Mallory rule seriously hampers the police of
Washington, D. C., or that the rule seriously affects the rate of
convictions or of crime itself. They also state that the FBI gets
along very well with the McNabb-Mallory rule. I cannot answer
the first point with any statistics of my own-and I do not think
'For details of the MdVabb-Mallmy rule and its application see Inbau, The Confessio, )iLemma
in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442 (1948), and Inbau, Police Interrogation-A
Practical Necessity, 52J. CUM. L., C. & P.S. 16 (1961).
9 Kamisar, supra note 3, at 184.
10 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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statistics can support the opposite viewpoint either-but some
simple logic is available to support the proposition that the
McNabb-Mallorq rule does, and is bound to have, a crippling ef-
fect upon law enforcement in any metropolitan jurisdiction
saddled with the rule. But before developing this point I first
wish to state that the FBI and the other national law enforce-
ment agencies are not confronted by the same crime problems
that are encountered by a metropolitan police department such
as that in Washington, D. C. For instance, when the FBI is in-
vestigating cases like those involving the interstate transporta-
tion of stolen automobiles or of women for purposes of
prostitution, or even cases of suspected espionage, there are
many investigative procedures that may be employed and rela-
tively little need exists for the interrogation of suspects them-
selves. Moreover, time is usually not a critical factor, and
manpower and funds are ample for the volume of federal cases
to be investigated. But a vastly different situation confronts the
police of a city such as Washington, D. C., with its high inci-
dence of robberies, burglaries, rapes, etc.-crimes that ordinar-
ily cannot be solved except by the interrogation of the suspects
themselves, since physical clues or any other evidence of guilt
are seldom available.
In communities such as Washington, D. C., most serious
crimes will remain unsolved if the police are not permitted to
interrogate criminal suspects. To prohibit police interroga-
tion-which, in effect, is what the McNabb-Malloqy rule does-
means, therefore, that fewer crimes will be solved and
successfully prosecuted. More criminals will remain at large, to
commit other offenses. At the same time the deterrent effect of
apprehension and conviction will be lost insofar as other
potential offenders are concerned. The crime rate is bound to
be greater under such circumstances, and I do not feel the need
of statistics to support that conclusion.
One of my critics, Professor Alfred R. Lindesmith n states
that "in England police handling of suspects is guided by the
Judges' Rules which, incidentally, forbid interrogation of the
defendant after arrest." The implication is that the police in the
United States could get by without interrogation opportunities.
But I call Professor Lindesmith's attention to the fact that the
police in England, out of practical necessity, have circumvented
"See Lindesmith, Letter to the Editor, 53J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 231 (1962).
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the rules out of existence; the Judges' Rules are now dead let-
ters in England. In support of this statement I refer Professor
Lindesmith to the published statements of two outstanding po-
lice officials and also to one of England's most respected legal
scholars, Professor Glanville Williams. 2 Moreover, in England
the courts will admit a confession obtained in violation of the
Judges' Rules if it is otherwise voluntary.
By way of some further answers to my critics, I wish to repeat
again several of my viewpoints which have been stated publicly
by me on many previous occasions:
I am unalterably opposed to the "third degree" and to any
other interrogation tactics or techniques that are apt to make an
innocent person confess. I am opposed, therefore, to the use of
force, threats, or promises of leniency-all of which might make
an innocent person confess; but I do approve of other types of
psychological tactics and techniques that are necessary in order
to secure incriminating information from the guilty, or investi-
gative leads from otherwise uncooperative witnesses or prospec-
tive informants.
I am opposed to illegal police searches and seizures, but I
do not believe that the United States Supreme Court had the
right to order the states to free guilty persons merely because
the police had acted illegally in obtaining the evidence of guilt.
I also feel that there are other ways to guard against police law-
lessness, and again I wish to repeat what I have said many times
before: The only real, practically attainable protection we can
afford ourselves against police abuses of individual rights and
liberties is to see to it that our police are selected and promoted
on a merit basis, that hey [sic] are properly trained, adequately
compensated, and that they are permitted to remain substan-
tially free from politically inspired interference. Along with
these requirements I also add the necessity for realistic laws and
rules governing arrest, search and seizure, and criminal interro-
gations, so that there will be no practical necessity for evasion of
"One such acknowledgment was made by the Chief Constable of County Durham, England:
St.Johnston, The Legal Limitations of the Interrgation of Suspects and Prisoners in England and Wales,
39J. CRIM. L. & C. 89 (1948). Another such acknowledgment was made by the Commander of
the Criminal Investigation Department, New Scotland Yard, London, England: Hatherill, Practi-
cal Problems in Interrogation, in INTERNATIONAL LECTURES ON POLICE SCIENCE (Western Reserve
Univ., 1956). And see Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitation Under Foreign Law-
England, 52 J. CRIM. L., C & P.S. 51 (1961), republished in SOWLE, POLICE POWER AND
INDIDUAL FREEDOM: THE QUEST FOR BALANCE 185 (1962).
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the law by the police in their efforts to furnish the protection
and safety that the public demands of them. Individual civil lib-
erties can survive in such an atmosphere, alongside the protec-
tive security of the public.
One further point: I am not one of those persons who feels
that all criminals have to be caught and sent to jail. I am per-
fectly willing to settle for the apprehension and conviction of
only enough of them to discourage criminal conduct. What I
do object to is the present day trend on the part of some courts
and legislatures to lay down rules and regulations which are
making it almost impossible to apprehend and convict anybody!
It is time that a balance be struck between individual civil liber-
ties and public protection.
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